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Abstract 
 
 Prior to the passage of each farm bill, there is much debate regarding the 
programs contained within it. One of these programs is federal crop insurance, which 
underwent a major shift in the mid-1990’s with the introduction of revenue-based crop 
insurance rather than yield-based. Revenue-based programs provide insurance of a 
certain revenue level, rather than a certain yield level, which contributed to their 
popularity among producers. These revenue-based programs have become a key 
component of federal crop insurance. From 2014 to 2018, the costs of federal crop 
insurance were approximately $41 billion, much of this a result of subsidized insurance 
premiums. Thus, there is much debate as to the benefits to producers justifying the 
costs. To research the benefits producers receive from these programs, a literature 
review was conducted drawing from various sources in order to summarize research as 
to the efficacy of these programs. 
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Effects on Producers of the Transition to Revenue-Based Federal Crop Insurance 
Programs 
 
I. Introduction 
 The highest level of agricultural policy in the United States stems from what is 
known as the farm bill – a law that typically expires after four years with its twelve titles 
encompassing a wide range of policies, such as: commodity programs, conservation 
programs, trade, and nutrition (Johnson & Monke, 2017). As the 2014 farm bill expires 
in 2018, changes to federal agricultural policy have entered the political discussion, 
including debate on Title XI of the 2014 farm bill, federal crop insurance. As is typical in 
policy discussions, costs and benefits must be evaluated, and according to Johnson & 
Monke the costs of federal crop insurance increased by 11% each year from 2008 to 
2014 (2017). In the mid 1990’s, subsidized revenue-based crop insurance programs 
were introduced, and their popularity surged and are still much more widespread than 
their yield-based counterparts (Glauber, 2013). This begs the question as to the efficacy 
of revenue-based crop insurance with regards to producers’ benefits, and whether or 
not these benefits have merited the $41 billion in costs over the course of the 2014 farm 
bill (Johnson & Monke, 2017). 
II. Federal Crop Insurance Background 
 Prior to the passage of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 (AAA), most 
United States federal farm policy was designed to indirectly assist farmers, notably the 
Homestead of Act of 1862 which granted 160 acres to any individual who settled on and 
improved these acres for 5 years. Other policies included the establishment of land-
   
   
2
grant colleges such as the University of Nebraska, experiment stations, the extension 
service, and the United States Department of Agriculture. (Kramer, 1983). Following 
several occasions of severe price depressions within a decade, government policy 
shifted toward a more direct approach, beginning with the establishment of the 
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) in 1933. The CCC is a government corporation 
that functions as a lender for the USDA’s price support programs (Womach, 2005). It 
also has the authority to buy, sell, lend, make payments, and engage in activities to 
ensure production and stable prices for United States farmers (Womach, 2005). These 
programs are carried out through the Farm Service Agency, or FSA.  
 Severe droughts in 1934 and 1936 created enough public and government 
interest in a more “interventionist” approach to commodity markets, which became 
presidential campaign issues in President’s Roosevelt’s second presidential election 
(Kramer, 1983). Shortly before the 1936 election, Roosevelt established the President’s 
Committee on Crop Insurance, which created one of the earliest forms of federal crop 
insurance in the United States. This program only covered wheat and did not insure 
against the possibility that prices would fall. The United States Department of 
Agriculture was to oversee the program; policies were to be sold by local committees 
and boards of directors. Finally, it was recommended that premiums be calculated as 
they would for any other insurance policy (by considering the probability of yield losses), 
while farmers would be insured for a percentage of their typical production (Kramer, 
1983). A 1938 bill that created the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation, or FCIC, is also 
considered to be the first farm bill. “Farm bill” began as an informal term for omnibus 
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laws, typically passed every five years, containing commodity and farm supports. Since 
1973, these have been officially referred to as Farm Bills (Womach, 2005). 
 In 1980, still only half of US counties and 26 crops were covered by federal crop 
insurance, which was primarily Multi-Peril Crop Insurance or MPCI (Glauber, 2013). 
Multi-peril crop insurance protects against “natural perils” such as hail, high winds, 
insects, or fires (Womach, 2005). With the passage of the Federal Crop Insurance Act 
of 1980, crop insurance programs were widely expanded to cover a greater area of the 
US and more crops (Shields, 2015). According to Glauber (2013), the 1980 law was 
passed with the intention to shift producer’s risk management focus to catastrophic 
(total loss) protection in order to increase participation in the program. It had three 
components. First, premiums were subsidized to promote participation. Before the 1980 
law, farmers had to pay the full premium, whereas they now had to pay 70%. Second, 
standing disaster programs were discontinued in counties where crop insurance was 
made available. Third, rather than the USDA either directly managing individual policies, 
or contracting with a private agent to do so, crop insurance would now be handled by 
private companies (Glauber, 2013). According to Glauber, Congress reasoned that in 
order to increase participation, a more “active” sales force was required. These 
companies would be reimbursed for operating expenses but would also receive a share 
in profits (or suffer from the result of losses). However, the 1980 bill did not result in the 
expected increases in participation. A 1986 study by Gardner and Kramer found that 
premiums may have to be subsidized 50% to get 50% of farmers to participate 
(Glauber, 2013). 
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 The Crop Insurance Reform Act of 1994 once again altered federal crop 
insurance by requiring farmers to participate in the crop insurance program to be eligible 
for participation in price support programs (Glauber, 2013). Specifically, they were 
required to participate in catastrophic risk protection (CAT). CAT compensates growers 
for yield losses over 50% of their average historical yield at a rate of 55% of the average 
market price. Farmers were also given the option to “buy-up” additional coverage but 
must cover the buy-up cost. Otherwise, the Crop Insurance Reform Act fully subsidized 
basic CAT coverage by the federal government, and farmers would simply have to pay 
$50 per crop per county (Womach, 2005). By 1995, approximately 220 million acres 
were enrolled in the program, which was about 80% of eligible acres at the time. In 
1996, the CAT purchase requirement for price support was eliminated, reducing 
enrollment – though purchases of additional coverage continued to increase, with the 
passage of the 2000 bill, participation rates seemed to have steadied at around 80% 
(Glauber, 2013).  
 Congress continued to make attempts to incentivize farmers to enroll in the 
program, passing the Agricultural Risk Protection Act in 2000 (Glauber, 2013). This law 
once again increased subsidy levels, and enrollment once again increased to over 265 
million acres (it had decreased to about 182 million acres following the removal of fully 
subsidized payments in 1996). As Glauber notes in his 2013 study The Growth of the 
Federal Crop Insurance Program, there was a clear correlation between the rate of 
enrollment and level of subsidization of premiums. 
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 While in 1990, all policies offered by the FCIC were yield-based, revenue policies 
were introduced in the mid-1990’s. Rather than using a yield average and calculating 
producers’ losses based on a certain set crop price, payments would be calculated 
using revenue losses. In 1993, the FCIC began offering an area yield group insurance 
pilot program known as the Group Risk Plan (GRP) to soybean producers. Group risk 
plans differ from individual policies in that indemnities are paid on a county-wide loss 
basis. For example, if an entire county experienced below average production, all 
farmers participating in the group risk plan would receive payment (Womach, 2005). 
The following year, President Clinton indicated his support for GRP in the federal 
budget, and congress expanded the program essentially nationwide (Glauber, 2013). 
Another group program created in 1999 was an area-based revenue insurance plan, 
known as the Group Revenue Insurance Program, or GRIP (Glauber, 2013). GRIP was 
available at limited levels where GRP was also available (Womach, 2005). Area-based 
insurance plans pay indemnities when either yield (in the case of GRP) or revenue (in 
the case of GRIP) drops below a certain “trigger” level (Paulson & Babcock, 2007).  
III. Present-Day US Crop Insurance Programs 
  In 2013, the USDA Risk Management Service replaced group insurance 
plans with Area Risk Protection Insurance, or ARPI (USDA, 2013). The agency’s 
reasoning behind this change was to increase efficiency of federal crop insurance at the 
administrative level by consolidating the different insurance plans offered into a system 
with uniform pricing and policy provisions, thereby reducing costs. Area Risk Protection 
Insurance also includes an optional component for revenue-based insurance policies 
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known as the Harvest Price Option, or HPO. The harvest price option allows farmers to 
set a revenue level based on early season or pre-plant prices, but if the price of the 
insured crop improves by harvest time they can opt to set their revenue level (and thus 
indemnity payments) at the harvest price instead. In an assessment of the HPO, 
researchers at the University of Illinois found that 91.6% of corn producers, 91.2% of 
soybean producers, and 87.2% of rice producers opted for revenue protection with the 
harvest price option, and only 0.6%, 0.6%, and 0.4%, respectively opted for risk 
protection with the harvest price exclusion (Zulauf, Schnitkey, Coppess, Paulson, 2017). 
The remaining acres were insured by yield protection. It is not difficult to understand the 
immense popularity of the HPO program, given that it is an extra tool to eliminate risk.   
 While the federal crop insurance has undergone many changes since its 
inception in the 1930’s, according to Serra, Goodwin, and Featherstone one of its most 
significant changes occurred with the introduction of revenue-based crop insurance 
programs in the 1990’s (2003). At this time the federal crop insurance program was 
considered by some, such as Harrington & Doering, to no longer be meeting the needs 
of producers (1993). The goal of federal crop insurance programs has also remained 
largely the same: to protect producers from severe financial loss and bankruptcy, while 
ensuring a steady supply of the crops they produce. Since their introduction, however, 
revenue-based instruments such as have rapidly increased in popularity. Rather than 
only receiving support when yields are low, producers can also receive revenue support 
when prices are low (Dismukes, 2002).  
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 Some of the new insurance products introduced in the mid and late 1990’s 
include crop revenue coverage (CRC), Revenue Assurance (RA), and Income 
Protection (IP) products (Serra et al., 2003). Crop revenue coverage provides insurance 
against low yields, low prices, or both. Revenue assurance is similar to CRC in that it is 
designed to protect producers from both yield losses and price losses. However rather 
than using a nationally set price, farmers can opt to use a set county income level that 
may more closely account for variables such as local input prices (Womach, 2005). 
Income protection differs from CRC in that the farmer themselves selects their target 
revenue level. CRC programs have generally been the most widely available as well as 
the most popular form of revenue-based policies (Dismukes, 2002). CRC policies have 
a set revenue level at which indemnities are paid either as a result of crop or price 
losses (or a combination of both). However, they differ from other revenue programs in 
that producers can select either the market or planting price as the “target” level of 
revenue, which has likely influenced the popularity this particular program (Dismukes, 
2002). Paulson & Babcock also note that these programs have raised questions as to 
their classification as farm bill commodity programs or crop insurance programs. These 
are differentiated in that farm bill programs are funded at limited to no administrative 
cost to producers, while crop insurance commodity programs require that producers pay 
some of these administrative fees (2007). 
 With the introduction of revenue-based crop insurance policies came many 
studies of their ability and means of continuing to provide the financial support 
producers required, such as a 1995 study conducted by Goodwin and Smith. According 
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to this study on the economic implications of crop insurance, there were several early 
proposals for revenue programs occurring in the political sphere as to how to increase 
participation in federal crop insurance programs. These include a 1993 proposal by 
Harrington and Doering, as well as the “Iowa Revenue Insurance Plan” put forth in a 
1995 farm bill study (Goodwin and Smith). They proposed a system in which MPCI 
would remain in addition to price insurance which would pay indemnities when prices 
fell below a certain trigger. The Iowa Revenue Assurance Plan was proposed in 1995 
following a study sponsored by the Iowa Farm groups. It entailed the consolidation of all 
price, insurance, and disaster relief programs into a single program. This revenue 
assurance program would guarantee farmers 70% of typical revenues (Goodwin & 
Smith). In their assessment of these proposals, Goodwin and Smith note that the Iowa 
Plan included a provision many economists had been in support of for years: the 
decoupling of farm programs (1995). Decoupling refers to the separation of federal 
payments (in any form) from the requirement that specific crops be produced, or a 
specific land use be implemented. It removes what economists and producers alike 
viewed as a contradiction: farmers were to reduce production to reduce oversupply but 
were also encouraged to increase production because benefits were connected to 
output (Womach, 2005). With the 2002 Farm Bill, direct payments were decoupled from 
production and prices. Other proposals noted in Goodwin & Smith’s study included cost-
of-production insurance, whole farm Insurance, and rainfall Insurance (1995). Cost-of-
production insurance is similar to the basic concept of revenue insurance, but with costs 
of production being used to calculate target revenue levels instead of expected income 
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from crop production. Whole farm insurance policies insure farms as a whole rather 
than individual crops. Atwood & Watts note in a 1994 study that because exogenous 
conditions such as weather and markets affect different crops in varied ways, insurance 
companies could more accurately price premiums and calculate indemnities. Finally, the 
rainfall insurance concept was developed after policies created, though not 
implemented, in Australia. In essence, rather than triggering at certain price or farm 
revenue levels, payments are triggered below certain rainfall levels. 
 As of 2014, 294 million acres are covered by federal crop insurance programs, 
with corn, wheat, soybeans, and cotton making up approximately 70% of these acres 
(Shields, 2015). The differences between the federal crop insurance program and farm 
commodity support program should also be noted. The federal crop insurance program, 
through the FCIC, provides various insurance programs which cover over 130 different 
crops grown across the United States. The farm commodity support program provides 
price and income supports for a smaller number of crops, including corn, wheat, rice, 
and peanuts (Shields, 2015).  
 The current crop insurance policies offered by the federal government are 
entirely sold and serviced through private insurance companies (Coble & Barnett, 
2012).  The agreement between the USDA and these companies is known as the 
standard reinsurance agreement, or SRA (Womach, 2005). This agreement establishes 
terms and conditions under which the federal government provides subsidies and 
reinsurance, or insurance for an insurance company. These private companies share in 
the risk of underwriting crop insurance policies with the federal government, an 
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approximately $45 billion liability (Coble, Dismukes, Glauber, 2007). As of 2014, crop 
insurance premiums are subsidized at an average rate of 62% (Shields, 2015). There 
are currently 18 private companies through which policies are sold and serviced. 
Shields notes that while the companies’ losses are covered by the USDA, their 
administrative and operating costs are covered by the federal government. According to 
the CRS, the four crops accounting for 70% of planted acres – corn, cotton, soybeans, 
and wheat – also had high levels of coverage among planted acres. 83% plantings of 
corn were covered; 91%, 84%, and 86% of cotton, soybeans, and wheat, respectively, 
were covered (Shields, 2015). 
IV. Analysis 
 Over eighty years after its introduction, federal crop insurance remains a 
consistent topic of discussion in farm policy in the United States. Thus, with the debate 
of each farm bill comes debate on the efficacy of federal crop insurance. At various 
points in its existence, the program has fallen under criticism. In particular, criticism 
typically stems from the possibility that the program encourages excessive moral hazard 
– leading producers to increase their risk in production choices. In the 1970’s, critics 
found that the program was too expensive and that it encouraged farmers to produce on 
marginal land, driving up the insurance costs (Glauber & Collins, 2002). 
 Aside from the issues raised regarding the cost-effectiveness, a key question in 
the crop insurance debate is to whether it has fulfilled its original goals of shielding 
producers from unpredictable losses, particularly with recent changes to the program, 
such as the addition of revenue-based crop insurance and its replacement of yield-
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based programs as by far the most common insurance program. As the most recent 
significant change to occur, farm profitability and overall financial health following the 
introduction of revenue-based programs will be examined in order to determine the 
programs efficacy, and whether or not the introduction of the new revenue-based 
programs have disadvantaged agricultural producers over yield-based programs. 
Because there are myriad ways to determine the results of the change to revenue-
based crop insurance, a literature review was performed in order to synthesize research 
on crop insurance in the United States since revenue-based programs became popular. 
V. Literature Review 
 In response to the introduction of revenue-based policies in the mid-1990s, in 
2000 a group of researchers studied their affect (as well as the effects of yield policies), 
on producers’ decisions in the futures market. Due to crop insurance’s implications 
regarding production risks, Coble, Heifner, and Zuniga (2000) investigated how the new 
revenue products affected and would continue to affect demand in the futures and 
options markets. The futures and options markets had long been used as a means to 
manage risk, and Coble et al. argued that this added an entirely new dimension to the 
best practices farmers should now utilize when hedging (2000). They developed models 
of all revenue-based insurance offerings and used models of “representative farms” to 
test the insurance models. The representative farms were created using statistics from 
Iroquois County Illinois, Douglas County Kansas, Lincoln County Nebraska, and Pitt 
County North Carolina. These counties were selected in order to closely represent real-
world yield variations and price correlations (Coble et al., 2000). 
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 In their conclusion, Coble et al. reveal that the introduction of the new revenue-
based insurance policies changed the context in which farmers determine how to hedge 
when marketing their crops (2000). However, this is not surprising given that insurance 
products of all types are considered tools of risk management and opting for one risk 
management tool affects an individual’s decision-making process in selecting another 
tool. This study found that revenue-based insure products tend to reduce demand for 
hedging when compared to an equivalent yield-based product, though by an amount 
less than 10%. In addition, research showed that Crop Revenue Coverage and Market 
Value Protection (a type of product offered privately at that time) tended to 
“complement” hedging more so than other revenue products. Essentially, they found 
that revenue-based insurance products led to a larger reduction in use of other risk 
reducing methods (such as use of futures) when compared to yield-based revenue 
products. In a similar study conducted in 2002, Wang, Makus, and Chen created a 
similar model to that of Coble, Heifner, and Zuniga in order to determine how adding 
revenue-based insurance products as a risk management option affects usage of 
hedging. While the 2000 Coble et al. study focused more on crops grown in the Midwest 
and on the east coast, the 2002 Wang et al. study investigated the insurance products’ 
effects in the Pacific Northwest. However, they also found that Crop Revenue Coverage 
combined with other government payments as well as futures to be the optimum risk 
management combination for farmers. 
 In 2004 Gray, Boehlje, Gloy, and Slinsky analyzed federal crop insurance 
efficacy by looking at how the program can affect returns to land. Income can be put 
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back into the farm operation in two different ways: by increasing the expected returns to 
the farm or by altering the distribution of returns to the farm. Gray et al. also noted that 
the effects of any one risk mitigation program may be limited when combined with 
others (Gray et al., 2004). policies examined by the group were the Agricultural Market 
Transaction Act (AMTA) contract payments, the Marketing Loan Program (MLP), and 
Market Loss Assistance (MLA), as well as the federal crop insurance programs. All were 
researched in their form presented in the 1996 farm bill. The AMTA policies were 
eliminated with the 2002 farm bill and replaced with a newer payment program 
(Womach, 2005). The Marketing Loan Program allows producers to borrow against their 
production, so they do not have to sell when prices are low so that they can wait for 
higher prices. Market Loss Assistance was a program enacted from 1998 to 2001 that 
was essentially disaster payments passed as an emergency measure by congress for 
those years (Gray et al., 2004). 
 In their study, Gray et al. used a typical Indiana corn and soybean farm as the 
basis for a model with variable price risk, yield risk, income risk, corn and soybean 
prices, corn and soybean yields, and farm income. Distributions of the model were 
designed to closely model real-world conditions (such as avoiding negative prices). Two 
thousand iterations of the model were run for each of 2 scenarios. Under scenario 1, 
MLP and AMTA programs were applied to the simulated market conditions. Under 
scenario 2, MLP and AMTA were once again used with the addition of Crop Revenue 
Coverage (CRC) Insurance. The researchers assumed a 75% coverage level for the 
crop insurance. Their findings revealed that when Crop Revenue Coverage was 
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included with other common assistance programs, the mean “returns to land” and 
variability slightly decreased. (Gray et al., 2004). The researchers also found that CRC 
had a positive effect when combined with non-insurance support programs. Overall, 
Gray et al. concluded that farm program payments increase expected returns, thus 
moderating risk and leading land owners to command higher rents for producers. This 
directly contradicts one of the missions of the 1996 farm bill which was to allow farmers 
to more effectively interpret market signals. The second implication was that by 
providing large farm program payments ($24 billion in 2000), the risk-reducing benefits 
of federal crop insurance such as CRC were reduced. The government spent $8.2 
billion on crop insurance subsidies from 1996-2002. They stated that their research 
suggested that such a level of subsidized federal crop insurance was necessitated by 
the $24 billion spent on other farm programs, thus reducing the value of crop insurance 
from the farmer’s perspective and increasing the level of premium subsidies required for 
participation to be maintained at a desirable level (Gray et al., 2004). 
 While many of the studies performed on the effects of revenue-based crop 
insurance programs considered only a single crop, most farmers grow two or more 
crops (Woodard et al., 2010). Researchers at Texas A&M University and the University 
of Illinois Urbana-Champaign saw a gap in research and examined the possibility that in 
a multi-cropping situation crop insurance may alter the risks of production (2010). This 
study expanded upon previous research in order to examine how growing multiple crops 
and crop insurance policies interact. Utilizing farm data from an Illinois database (similar 
to the study previously discussed, these can be considered farms “typical” for the 
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region), Woodard et al. utilized a model of all components of a production situation: 
yield, county yield, price, government programs, and production costs. In simulating real 
farms using real farm data, researchers then applied information such as policy 
availability, premium prices, level of subsidization, and market conditions that were 
available at the time the farm information was recorded in order to predict responses to 
insurance under multiple-crop systems. 
 Woodard et al. concluded that when farmers produce several different crops, as 
is often the case, the effectiveness decreases when moving from single-cropping, but 
only under individual products rather than group products, such as GRIP. As a result, 
they suggest these findings be taken into consideration in future policy work and 
recommend that multi-cropping regimes be considered in policy studies in the same 
way that single-cropping is (Woodard et al.). 
  There are also studies in which researchers suggest that federal crop insurance 
has a negligible, or negative affect on the overall profitability of producers. The structure 
of farm-finances and their income allocation provide an opening for price support 
programs (such as crop insurance) to play a role in “smoothing” out this income in order 
for producers to better plan for future production (Mishra & Cooper, 2017). In a 2017 
study Impact of farm programs on farm households in the US, A.K. Mishra and J.C. 
Cooper examined the effects of multiple farm programs, including crop insurance, on 
farm households. While Mishra & Cooper used all forms of farm program payments in 
their research, programs were not consolidated into one value and thus crop insurance 
is a separately considered. Mishra & Cooper conclude that farm households, on 
average, would require a $27,000 increase in indemnity payments from this crop 
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insurance before they would experience less expenditures, which in this study would 
indicate more money going into savings accounts (2017). 
VI. Conclusion 
 Following their introduction in the mid-1990s, revenue-based crop insurance 
programs have quickly replaced yield-based programs in the United States, utilized by 
over 90% of corn and soybean producers (Zulauf et al., 2017). However, it should not 
have been difficult to predict that these programs would be so popular. With revenue 
insurance, farmers are protected from losses due to either lower yields or prices, or a 
combination of the two. Thus, with their now relative ubiquity in the US, there exists a 
significant amount of literature as to how the revenue-based programs benefit farmers. 
Overall, farmers generally have benefited from the introduction of these insurance 
products or they have at least not been to their detriment.  
 In their 2000 study, Coble et al. found that revenue-based crop insurance can 
play a supplementary role when compared to market risk management practices such 
as futures and options hedging. This change is only slight, as the decrease in demand 
for hedging when revenue-based insurance coverage is available is less than 10%. 
Wang et al.’s 2002 study on farmers in the pacific northwest also had similar findings 
regarding the demand for hedging when revenue-based insurance products are in the 
mix, though their findings also emphasized that the two can (and should) be 
complementary. A similar theme was found in Gray et al.’s study, in which they 
simulated returns to land under government programs only and under government 
programs combined with Crop Revenue Coverage (2004). Under CRC, mean returns to 
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land to did not increase, while variability of returns decreased, and more farmers 
experienced positive returns than before, indicating there are some benefits to the 
program. There is also literature that posits there are no clear benefits to the program, 
such as Mishra & Cooper (2017) who suggest that higher indemnities are required for 
producers to truly see benefits of a revenue-based crop insurance program (which 
would have even farther reaching economic implications). Woodard et al. also suggest 
that more thorough investigation into the outcomes of real-world crop insurance policies 
is required, as producers in multi-cropping situations found a decrease in the 
effectiveness of risk reduction compared with those practicing single cropping, 
particularly when they utilized individual rather than group polices (Woodard et al., 
2010). Other studies such as Coble & Miller (2006) and Claassen et al. (2016) indicate 
that while producers may not realize any gains selecting revenue-based programs over 
yield-based programs, there is the genuine possibility of negative externalities, 
particularly undue moral hazard resulting from farmers engaging in high-risk production 
(such as on marginal land). Thus, revenue-based crop insurance policies’ true effects 
on producers in the United States may not be fully measurable without further research. 
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